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We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive
decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight
placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision.
Communication takes place before a proposal is oered and majority rule voting determines
the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In
particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communi-
cate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would \compromise"
or \ght" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse o when bargaining with two
legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition be-
tween the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable
preferences, the proposer is always better o making proposals for the two dimensions together.
JEL classication: C78, D72, D82, D831 Introduction
Legislative policy-making typically involves speeches and demands by legislators that may shape
the proposals made by the leadership. For example, in the 2010 health care overhaul in the
U.S., one version of the Senate bill included $100 million in Medicaid funding for Nebraska
and restrictions on abortion coverage in exchange for the vote of Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson.
As another example, consider the threat in 2009 by seven members of the U.S. Senate Budget
Committee to withhold their support for legislation to raise the debt ceiling unless a commission
to recommend cuts to Medicare and Social Security is approved.1 Would these senators indeed
have let the United States default on its debt, or was their demand just a blu? More generally,
what are the patterns of demands in legislative policy-making? How much information do they
convey? Do they inuence the nature of the proposed bills? Who gets private benets and
what kind of policies are chosen under the ultimately accepted bills?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to have a legislative bargaining model in which
legislators make demands before the proposal of the bills. One approach is to assume that
the demands serve as a commitment device, that is, the legislators refuse any oer that does
not meet their demands.2 While this approach oers interesting insights into some of the
questions above, it relies on the strong assumption that legislators commit to their demands.3
In this paper, we oer a dierent approach that allows legislators to make speeches without
commitment when casting their votes. The premise of our approach is that only individual
legislators know which bills they prefer to the status quo. So even if the legislators do not
necessarily carry out their threats, their demands may be meaningful rhetoric in conveying
private information and dispelling some uncertainty in the bargaining process.
We model rhetoric as cheap-talk messages as in Matthews (1989). In our model, (1) three
legislators bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision; (2) one of the legislators,
called the chair, formulates a proposal; (3) each legislator other than the chair is privately
informed about his own preferences; (4) communication takes place before a proposal is oered;
(5) majority rule voting determines whether the proposal is implemented.
We assume each legislator's position on a unidimensional ideological spectrum is publicly
1http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/67293-sens-squeeze-speaker-over-commission
2This is the approach taken by Morelli (1999) in a complete information framework. He does not explicitly
model the proposal-making and the voting stages. As such, the commitment assumption is implicit.
3Politicians often make empty threats. See, for example, http://tinyurl.com/the-hill-on-blu.
1known, but his ideological intensity, i.e., the weight he places on the ideological dimension
relative to the distributive dimension is his private information. As such, the chair is unsure
how much transfer she has to oer to a legislator to gain his support for a policy decision,
but she can use the messages sent in the communication stage to make inferences about his
ideological intensity (i.e., his type). We focus on a class of equilibria called simple monotone
equilibria in which the types who send the same message form an interval (monotone), and the
proposal does not depend on the message of a legislator if he receives no transfer (simple).
We show that in any simple monotone equilibrium: (1) At most one legislator's messages
convey some information about his preferences (Proposition 4, (i)). (2) In particular, if the
legislator whose position is closer to the chair's wants to move the policy in the same direction
as the chair does, then it is impossible for the other legislator (i.e., the legislator whose position
is further away from the chair's) to be informative (Proposition 4, (ii)). (3) Although the
closer legislator may be informative, even he can convey only limited information (Proposition
5). Specically, he sends a \ght" message when he places a relatively high weight on the
ideological dimension, and the chair responds with a proposal that involves minimum policy
change and gives neither legislator any private benet since the message indicates that there is
no room for making a deal. When he places a relatively low weight on the ideological dimension,
he sends a \compromise" message and the chair responds by oering some private benet in
exchange for moving the policy closer to her own ideal. In contrast to the classic Crawford
and Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk in which the sender conveys increasingly more precise
information when the players' interests become closer, here, it is impossible for even the closer
legislator to convey information more than whether he will \compromise" or \ght," no matter
how close his position is to the chair's.
Surprisingly, bargaining with two legislators under majority rule may make the chair worse
o than if she bargains with only one legislator (who can veto a bill). Under complete informa-
tion, the chair is clearly better o when bargaining with two legislators instead of one because
her bargaining position is improved. Under asymmetric information, however, the number of
legislators also aects the amount of information transmission. In particular, increased com-
petition may undermine a legislator's incentive to send the \ght" message, resulting in less
information transmitted in equilibrium, and this hurts the chair.
Since the players bargain over both an ideological dimension and a distributive dimension,
a natural question is whether it is better to bundle the two issues in one bill or negotiate over
2them separately. In our model, bundling always benets the chair because she can exploit the
dierences in the other legislators' trade-os between the two dimensions, and use private benet
as an instrument to make deals on policy changes that she wants to implement. This result,
however, depends on the nature of uncertainty regarding preferences. In a related working
paper (Chen and Eraslan, 2011), we show that bundling may result in informational loss when
ideological positions are private information, and in that case, bundling might hurt the chair.
Before turning to the description of our model, we briey discuss the related literature.
Starting with the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), legislative bargaining models
have become a staple of political economy and have been used in numerous applications. Like
our paper, some papers in the literature include an ideological dimension and a distributive
dimension (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Banks and Duggan (2000), Jackson and
Moselle (2002), and Diermeier and Merlo (2004)), but all these papers take the form of sequential
oers and do not incorporate demands. A smaller strand of literature, notably Morelli (1999),
instead models the legislative process as a sequential demand game where the legislators commit
to their demands.4 With the exceptions of Tsai (2009), and Tsai and Yang (2010 a, b), who
do not model demands, all of these papers assume complete information.
The cheap-talk literature has largely progressed in parallel to the bargaining literature.
Exceptions are Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Matthews (1989), and Matthews and Postlewaite
(1989). Of these Matthews (1989) is the most closely related. Our model diers from his by
having multiple legislators (rather than one) who are privately informed about their ideological
intensities (rather than ideological positions); moreover, in our model the players bargain over
an ideological and a distributive decision whereas in Matthews (1989), they bargain over only an
ideological decision. Our paper is also related to cheap talk games with multiple senders (e.g.,
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Austen-Smith (1993), Krishna and Morgan (2001a, b), Battaglini
(2002), and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008)). Our framework diers from these papers because
it has voting over the receiver's proposal and also incorporates a distributive dimension.
In the next section we describe our model. We rst consider the complete information model
as a benchmark in Section 3. We then study the bargaining game in which the legislators'
ideological intensities are private information. In Sections 4, we analyze the simpler game with
only one legislator (other than the chair) and then move on to analyze the game with two
legislators in Section 5. We discuss extensions and generalizations in Section 6.
4See also Vidal-Puga (2004), Montero and Vidal-Puga (2007), and Breitmoser (2009).
32 Model
Three legislators play a three-stage game to collectively decide on an outcome that consists of an
ideological component and a distributive component. For example, the legislators decide on the
level of environmental regulation and the distribution of government spending across districts.
Legislator 0 makes the proposal.5 From now on we simply refer to legislator 0 as the chair, and
use the term legislator to refer to the other two players. Let z = (y;x) where y is an ideological
decision and x = (x0;x1;x2) is a distributive decision. The set of feasible ideological decisions
is Y = R, and the set of feasible distributions is X = fx 2 R3 :
P2
i=0 xi  c;x1  0;x2  0g
where xi denotes the private benet of player i and c  0 is the size of the surplus available for
division. For i = 1;2, we say that proposal (y;x) includes legislator i if xi > 0 and excludes
legislator i if xi = 0.6 The status quo allocation is s = (~ y; ~ x) where ~ y 2 Y and ~ x = (0;0;0).7
The payo of each player i = 0;1;2 depends on the ideological decision and his/her pri-
vate benet. We assume that the players' preferences are separable over the two dimensions.
Specically, player i has a quasi-linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function given by
ui (z;i; ^ yi) = xi + iv (y; ^ yi);
where z = (y;x) is the outcome, ^ yi 2 Y is player i's ideal point (ideological position), and i > 0
is the weight that player i places on his/her payo from the ideological decision relative to
the distributive decision. The marginal rate of substitution, (@ui=@y)=(@ui=@xi) = i(@v=@y),
measures player i's preference for ideology relative to private benet. With xed ^ yi, its absolute
value is increasing in i, which we call legislator i's ideological intensity parameter.
Legislator i = 1;2 privately observes the realization of i, called his type, a random variable
with probability distribution Pi. The set of possible types of legislator i is i = [i;i]  R+.
Let Fi denote the distribution function of i, i.e., Fi (t) = Pi (i  t). We assume that Fi is
continuous and has full support on i, and the legislators' types are independently distributed.
Although i is legislator i's private information, its distribution and other aspects of his payo
function, including ^ yi, are common knowledge. In the remainder of the paper, ^ yi is xed and
5We use \she" as the pronoun for the proposer and \he" as the pronoun for legislators 1 and 2.
6In the remainder of the paper, when we use i and j to index the legislators, we sometimes omit the quantiers
i = 1;2 or j = 1;2. When we refer to both legislator i and legislator j, we implicitly assume j 6= i.
7The assumption that ~ x = (0;0;0), together with the denition of X, implies that the total surplus for
reaching an agreement is non-negative, legislator 1's and legislator 2's status quo private benets are the same,
and the chair's proposal cannot oer private benets lower than his status quo for either legislator 1 or 2.
4we use ui(z;i) to denote legislator i's payo from outcome z when his type is i.
For simplicity we assume the chair's preferences are commonly known. Without loss of
generality, assume ^ y0 < ~ y, i.e., the chair would like to move the policy to the left of the status
quo. To simplify notation, we write u0 (z) = x0 + 0v (y; ^ y0) as the chair's payo from z.
We make the following assumptions on v: (1) v is twice dierentiable; (2) for any ^ yi 2 Y ,
v11 (y; ^ yi) < 0 for all y 2 Y (which implies that v is concave in y), and v (; ^ yi) reaches its
maximum at ^ yi; (3) v satises the single-crossing property in (y; ^ yi), i.e., for all y;y0; ^ yi; ^ y0
i 2 Y
such that y0 > y and ^ y0
i > ^ yi, if v (y0; ^ yi)  v (y; ^ yi), then v (y0; ^ y0
i) > v (y; ^ y0
i). This property
says that if legislator i whose ideal point is ^ yi weakly prefers y0 to y where y0 is to the right of
y, then any legislator whose ideal point is to the right of ^ yi strictly prefers y0 to y. Note that
the familiar quadratic-loss function, v (y; ^ yi) =  (y   ^ yi)
2, satises all of these assumptions.
The bargaining game has three stages. In stage one, each legislator i = 1;2 observes his
type i and sends a private message to the chair.8 In stage two, the chair observes the messages
and makes a proposal in Y X. In stage three, the players vote on the proposal under majority
rule. Without loss of generality we assume that the chair votes for the proposal. So a proposal
passes if at least one of legislators 1 and 2 votes for it. Otherwise, the status quo s prevails.
The set of allowed messages for legislator i, denoted by Mi, is a nite set that has more than
two elements. The messages have no literal meanings (we discuss their equilibrium meanings
later); they are also \cheap talk" since they do not aect the players' payos directly. The
assumption that Mi is nite rules out the possibility of separating equilibria, but we show that
separating equilibria are not possible even if Mi's are innite.
A strategy for legislator i consists of a message rule in the rst stage and an acceptance rule in
the third stage. A message rule i : i ! Mi species the message legislator i sends as a function
of his type. An acceptance rule i : Y  X  i ! f0;1g species how legislator i votes as a
function of his type: type i accepts a proposal z if i(z;i) = 1 and rejects it if i(z;i) = 0.9
The strategy set for legislator i consists of pairs of measurable functions (i;i) satisfying these
properties. The chair's strategy set consists of all proposal rules  : M1  M2 ! Y  X where
(m1;m2) is the proposal she oers when receiving (m1;m2). We focus on pure strategies and
8If the legislators send public messages simultaneously, our results still go through as long as each legislator
votes for a proposal if and only if he prefers that proposal to the status quo.
9Technically a legislator's acceptance rule can depend on his message. However, condition (E1) in the up-
coming denition of equilibrium says that legislator i accepts a proposal if and only if he prefers it to the status
quo, independent of the message he sent. As such, we suppress the dependence of i on mi.
5discuss conditions under which it is not restrictive to disallow mixed strategies later.
Fix a strategy prole (;;). Say that a message prole m = (m1;m2) induces proposal
z if  (m) = z. Proposal z is elicited by type i if it is induced by m with mi = i (i) and
fj : j(j) = mjg 6= ;. If z is induced by m, then, legislator i is pivotal with respect to z if
j (z;j) = 0 for all j such that j (j) = mj and non-pivotal with respect to z otherwise.
Equilibrium: To dene an equilibrium for this game, let i(zjmi) denote the probability that
legislator i votes to accept proposal z conditional on sending message mi. Given the strategy
(i;i) of legislator i, i is derived by Bayes' rule whenever possible. That is, i(zjmi) =
R
fi:i(i)=mig i(z;i)dFi(i)=
R
fi:i(i)=mig dFi(i) if
R
fi:i(i)=mig dFi(i) > 0.
An equilibrium is a strategy prole (;;) such that the following conditions hold for all
i 6= 0, i 2 i, y 2 Y;x 2 X and m 2 M1  M2:
(E1) i(z;i) = 1 if ui(z;i)  ui(s;i); and i(z;i) = 0 otherwise.
(E2)  (m) 2 argmaxz02Y X u0(z0)(z0jm) + u0(s)(1   (z0jm)), where
(z0jm) = 1  
 
1   1(z0jm1)
 
1   2(z0jm2)

is the conditional probability that z0 is accepted.
(E3) If i (i) = mi, then mi 2 argmaxm0
i Vi(m0
i;i) where
Vi(m0
i;i) =
Z
j

j
 

 
m0
i;j (j)

;j

ui
 

 
m0
i;j (j)

;i

+
 
1   j
 

 
m0
i;j (j)

;j

maxfui
 

 
m0
i;j (j)

;i

;ui (s;i)g

dFj (j):
Condition (E1) requires each legislator to accept a proposal if and only if he prefers it to the
status quo.10 Condition (E2) requires that equilibrium proposals maximize the chair's payo
10Condition (E1) strengthens the requirement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and is the only dierence
between our equilibrium solution concept and PBE. In particular, (E1) rules out the (weakly dominated) accep-
tance rule of accepting any proposal because a legislator expects that the other legislator accepts any proposal.
Note also that (E1) assumes that a legislator accepts z whenever indierent between z and s. If z = s, this is
inconsequential as s would prevail whether or not legislator i accepts it. Otherwise, this is not restrictive. This
is because if legislator i does not accept a proposal (not equal to s) when indierent, then an optimal proposal
does not exist for the chair. To see this, note that if the chair has an optimal proposal (y;x) 6= s, then at least
one legislator i must strictly prefer it to s. But then there exists  > 0 such that either (y;x
0) with x
0
i = xi   
or (y
0;x) with y
0 = y    is another proposal that legislator i strictly prefers to s and makes the chair better o,
contradicting the optimality of (y;x).
6and that her belief is consistent with Bayes' rule. Condition (E3) requires that a legislator
elicits only his most preferred distribution of proposals, incorporating the acceptance rules.
For expositional simplicity, from now on we assume that in equilibrium, if  (zjm) = 0, then
 (m) 6= z, i.e., if a proposal is rejected with probability 1, then the chair does not propose it.11
Say that a proposal z is elicited in the equilibrium (;;) if there exists (1;2) 2 1 2
such that z = (1(1);2(2)). For any xed strategy prole (;;), denote by ;; (1;2)
the outcome for (1;2); i.e., ;; (1;2) =  (1 (1);2 (2)) if i( (1 (1);2 (2));i) = 1
for at least one of i = 1;2 and ;; (1;2) = s otherwise. Say that two equilibria (;;)
and (0;0;0) are outcome equivalent if ;; = 0;0;0
.
A babbling equilibrium is an equilibrium (;;) in which i (i) = i (0
i) for all i;0
i 2 i,
i = 1;2, i.e., all types of legislator i send the same message, and  (m) =  (m0) for all
m;m0 2 M1 M2, i.e., the chair responds to all message proles with the same proposal. As is
standard in cheap-talk models, a babbling equilibrium always exists.
3 Benchmark: complete information
We start by analyzing the benchmark game of complete information, i.e., i is common knowl-
edge. Since there is no private information, the legislators' messages are irrelevant for the chair's
belief and her proposal. The modications of the players' strategies and equilibrium conditions
are straightforward and omitted. We next characterize the chair's equilibrium proposal.
If v(^ y0; ^ yi)  v(~ y; ^ yi) for some legislator i, i.e., if there is a legislator who prefers the chair's
ideal policy to the status quo policy, then the chair's problem is trivial: she proposes her ideal
policy and keeps all the private benet herself. From now on, we assume v(^ y0; ^ yi) < v(~ y; ^ yi) for
i = 1;2. Note that since ^ y0 < ~ y, this implies that ^ y0 < ^ yi for i = 1;2:
A useful piece of notation is e(^ yi) = minfy : v(y; ^ yi) = v(~ y; ^ yi)g, the left-most policy y that
makes legislator i indierent between y and ~ y. Since v (y; ^ yi) is increasing in y if y < ^ yi, given
that v(^ y0; ^ yi) < v(~ y; ^ yi), we have ^ y0 < e(^ yi)  ~ y, and e(^ yi) is the policy y that is closest to the
chair's ideal that leaves legislator i indierent between y and ~ y. Note that e(^ yi) is nondecreasing
in ^ yi, and in particular, e(^ yi) = ~ y if ^ yi  ~ y and e(^ yi) < ^ yi < ~ y if ^ yi < ~ y.
11This is not a restrictive assumption if c > 0 because the chair strictly prefers the proposal (~ y;c;0;0) (which
is accepted with probability 1) to the status quo, so z is not a best response. If c = 0, however, it is possible
that z is a best response, but not a unique one (for example, s is another best response).
7To start, suppose the chair faces only legislator 1 who has veto power, i.e., for any proposal
to pass, he must vote for it. Given 1, the chair chooses z1 (1) = (y1 (1);x1 (1)) to solve12
max
z2Y X
u0(z) = c   x1 + 0v(y; ^ y0)
subject to x1 + 1v(y; ^ y1)  1v(~ y; ^ y1). Since u0 (z) is decreasing in x1, for x1
1 to be optimal, it
satises x1
1 = 1
 
v(~ y; ^ y1)   v(y1; ^ y1)

.13 To satisfy x1
1  0, we must have v(~ y; ^ y1)  v(y1; ^ y1):
Thus, substituting for x1 in the chair's maximization problem, y1 must be a solution to
max
y2Y
c   1 (v(~ y; ^ y1)   v(y; ^ y1)) + 0v(y; ^ y0)
subject to v(~ y; ^ y1)  v(y; ^ y1): Since v11 < 0, the objective function is strictly concave and y1
is unique. If 1v1(e(^ y1); ^ y1) + 0v1(e(^ y1); ^ y0)  0, i.e., if 1 is suciently high, then v(~ y; ^ y1) 
v(y; ^ y1) is binding, and we have a corner solution y1 = e(^ y1) and x1
1 = 0. Otherwise, there
exists a unique y1 < e(^ y1) such that 1v1(y1; ^ y1) + 0v1(y1; ^ y0) = 0 and x1
1 > 0.
When the chair faces two legislators instead of one, her bargaining position is improved
since the voting rule is the majority rule. Let z2 (2) denote the chair's optimal proposal when
she faces only legislator 2 with ideological intensity 2. If u0
 
zi (i)

 u0
 
zj (j)

, then it is
optimal for the chair to propose (y;x) such that y = yi(i), x0 = xi
0(i), xi = xi
i(i) and xj = 0.
when she faces both legislators i and j. Notice that it is possible that the legislator whose ideal
policy is further away from the chair's is included in an optimal proposal. This can happen
when he puts suciently less weight on ideology than the other legislator does.
We now turn to the analysis of the model with incomplete information.
4 One sender
Although our focus is on the game with three players and majority rule, it is useful to rst
consider a simpler game with one legislator (sender) other than the chair. In addition to
providing useful intuition, the analysis is interesting in its own right because it is applicable
to bilateral bargaining over two issues. Let  S denote the game in which the set of legislators
other than the chair is S. In this section, we consider the case with S = f1g.
The modication of the players' strategies and equilibrium conditions in  f1g are straight-
forward and omitted. To classify equilibria, we dene the size of an equilibrium to be the
12For notational convenience, even when the chair faces only legislator i 2 f1;2g, we still assume that the
chair's proposal z is in Y  X and let xj = 0 for j 2 f1;2g and j 6= i.
13To simplify notation, we suppress the dependence of y
1 and x
1 on 1.
8number of proposals elicited in that equilibrium. To characterize equilibria, we rst establish
the following lemma. (Proofs omitted from the text are in the Appendix except for the proofs
of Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, which are in the Supplementary Appendix.)
Lemma 1. (i) If type 1 weakly prefers z0 = (y0;x0) to z = (y;x) where x0
1 > x1, then any type
0
1 < 1 strictly prefers z0 to z. (ii) If type 1 weakly prefers z00 = (y00;x00) to z = (y;x) where
x00
1 < x1, then any type 00
1 > 1 strictly prefers z00 to z.
A special case of Lemma 1 is worth noting: Suppose type 1 is indierent between the status
quo s and z = (y;x) where x1 > 0. If 0
1 < 1, then type 0
1 strictly prefers z to s; if 0
1 > 1, then
type 0
1 strictly prefers s to z. This immediately implies that legislator 1 does not fully reveal
his type in equilibrium.14 To see this, note that in a separating equilibrium, legislator 1 receives
only his status quo payo as the chair would make a proposal that leaves him just willing to
accept. But then type 1 would want to mimic a higher type (i.e., exaggerate his ideological
intensity) in order to get a better deal from the chair. In fact, we have a much stronger result
which says that for any equilibrium, at most one proposal elicited in it gives legislator 1 some
positive private benet, and an equilibrium has at most size two. But before deriving this result
and characterizing size-two equilibria, we rst characterize size-one equilibria.
4.1 Size-one equilibria
We focus on babbling equilibrium since any size-one equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a
babbling equilibrium. Let z0 be the proposal elicited in a babbling equilibrium.
To nd z0, note that by Lemma 1, if u1
 
z;  1

 u1
 
s;  1

, then u1 (z;1)  u1 (s;1) for
all 1 2 1 and z is always accepted; if u1 (z;1) < u1 (s;1), then u1 (z;1) < u1 (s;1) for all
1 2 1 and z is always rejected; if u1
 
z;  1

< u1
 
s;  1

and u1 (z;1)  u1 (s;1), then there
exists 1 2 1 such that u1 (z;1) = u1 (s;1) and z is accepted with probability F1 (1).
Let t1 (z) denote the highest type who is willing to accept z if z is accepted with positive
probability and set t1 (z) to 1 if z is accepted with probability 0. Formally
t1 (z) =
8
<
:
maxf1 2 1 : u1 (z;1)  u1 (s;1)g if u1 (z;1)  u1 (s;1);
1 otherwise.
14To be more precise, legislator 1 does not fully reveal his type in equilibrium except in the degenerate case
where z
1 (1) = (e(^ y1);c;0;0) for every 1 2 1. In this case, even if legislator 1 fully reveals his type, the chair
still makes the same proposal (e(^ y1);c;0;0) and we have a size-one equilibrium.
9For z0 to be the proposal elicited in a babbling equilibrium, it must satisfy
z0 2 argmax
z2Y X
u0 (z)F1 (t1 (z)) + u0 (s)[1   F1 (t1 (z))]:
We can also formulate the chair's problem as choosing the highest type who is willing to accept
her proposal. Let 0
1 = t1(z0), and let V (1) = u0
 
z1 (1)

denote the chair's highest payo
when facing legislator 1 of type 1. Then we have
0
1 2 argmax
121
V (1)F1 (1) + u0 (s)(1   F1 (1)). (1)
If the solution to (1) is unique, it is without loss of generality to consider only pure strategies.
If the objective function is strictly concave, then 0
1 is unique. Another sucient condition for
uniqueness is that the objective function is strictly increasing in 1. Lemma 8 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix shows that in the uniform-quadratic case (i.e., 1 is uniformly distributed
and v (y; ^ y1) =  (y   ^ y1)
2), if ^ y1 < ~ y, then the objective function is strictly increasing in 1
and (1) has a unique solution at  1; if ^ y1  ~ y and c > 0, then (1) may have an interior solution
and a solution at  1, but this happens only non-generically (i.e., x all the parameters of the
game except for c, the solution to (1) is unique except for at most one c).
4.2 Size-two equilibria
The main nding in this subsection is that legislator 1 can credibly convey some information,
but only in a limited way. We rst show that the number of proposals elicited in an equilibrium
is at most two and then characterize size-two equilibria and provide existence conditions.
The following lemma says that there is at most one proposal elicited in equilibrium that
gives legislator 1 a strictly positive transfer.
Lemma 2. Suppose proposals z0 = (y0;x0) and z00 = (y00;x00) are elicited in an equilibrium in
 f1g. If x0
1 > 0 and x00
1 > 0, then z0 = z00.
To gain some intuition, suppose there are two equilibrium proposals z0 and z00 that give
legislator 1 positive transfers. Then there exist a type 0
1 who elicits z0 and is indierent
between z0 and s, and a type 00
1 who elicits z00 and is indierent between z00 and s. Assume
00
1 > 0
1. Then by Lemma 1, type 0
1 strictly prefers to elicit z00 because he receives a payo
strictly higher than his status quo payo by doing so, a contradiction. So only one equilibrium
proposal can have x1 > 0. Such a proposal must have y < e(^ y1). When proposing it, the chair
makes some transfer to legislator 1 in exchange for moving the policy towards her own ideal.
10Now consider a proposal (y;x) with x1 = 0. If e(^ y1)  y  ~ y, all types accept it; if y < e(^ y1),
no type accepts it. Since v (y; ^ y0) is decreasing in y when y  e(^ y1), we have y = e(^ y1). Hence
there are at most two proposals elicited in an equilibrium: one is (e(^ y1);c;0;0) and the other is
(y;c   x1;x1;0) with y < e(^ y1) and x1 > 0. Henceforth, denote (e(^ y1);c;0;0) by zNT. Let 
1
be the type indierent between (y;c   x1;x1;0) and zNT. By Lemma 1, if 1 < 
1, then type
1 strictly prefers (y;c   x1;x1;0) to zNT and hence elicits (y;c   x1;x1;0). If 1 > 
1, then
type 1 strictly prefers zNT to (y;c   x1;x1;0). A type 1 > 
1 may elicit zNT and accept it or
elicit (y;c   x1;x1;0) and reject it: either way he gets his status quo payo. To summarize:
Proposition 1. In  f1g: (i) At most two proposals are elicited in any equilibrium. (ii) In a
size-two equilibrium, the elicited proposals are zNT and (y;c   x1;x1;0) with y < e(^ y1) and
x1 > 0. There exists a type 
1 such that if 1 < 
1, type 1 elicits (y;c   x1;x1;0) and accepts
it; if 1  
1, type 1 either elicits (y;c   x1;x1;0) and rejects it or elicits zNT and accepts it.
Proposition 1 says that a type above 
1 may either elicit (y;c   x1;x1;0) and reject it, or
elicit zNT and accept it. Note, however, that if there were any possibility of a \tremble" by
legislator 1 at the voting stage, i.e., if he might not carry out a planned veto and instead vote
for a proposal even though he strictly prefers s to it, then his best message rule is to safely
elicit zNT if 1 > 
1. The chair benets if all 1 > 
1 elicit zNT, since she prefers zNT to s.
Suppose the types who elicit the same proposal in equilibrium send the same message,15 and
mc
1 induces (y;c   x1;x1;0) and m
f
1 induces zNT. We can interpret mc
1 as the \compromise"
message and m
f
1 as the \ght" message. When the chair receives m
f
1, she infers that legislator
1 is likely to have a low ideological intensity, and responds with a \compromise" proposal
that moves the policy towards her own ideal. When the chair receives m
f
1, she infers that
legislator 1 is intensely ideological, and responds with a proposal that involves minimum policy
change and no transfer for legislator 1. This proposal in response to the \ght" message passes
with probability 1.16 Note that multiple size-two equilibria exist with dierent set of elicited
proposals corresponding to dierent thresholds 
1.
Recall that z1 (1) is the chair's optimal proposal when 1 is known.
Proposition 2. A size-two equilibrium exists in  f1g if and only if (i) z1   1

= zNT, and (ii)
z1 (1) = (y;c   x1;x1;0) for some y < e(^ y1) and x1 > 0.
15This loses no generality because any size-two equilibrium is outcome equivalent to such an equilibrium.
16Of course, the proposal induced by the \ght" message could be just maintaining the status quo. As such,
the passage of such a proposal can be interpreted as inaction by the chair on policy change.
11The conditions in Proposition 2 require the chair's optimal proposal to be zNT when she is
sure that legislator 1 is of the highest type and to be a proposal that has y < e(^ y1) and x1 > 0
when she is sure that legislator 1 is of the lowest type. Intuitively, under these conditions, there
exists a type 
1 2 (1;  1) such that zNT is optimal when the chair believes that 1 2
 

1;  1

and (y;c   x1;x1;0) 6= zNT is optimal when the chair believes that 1 2 (1;
1), which in turn
guarantees that a size-two equilibrium exists. From the analysis in Section 3, the existence
conditions in Proposition 2 are satised if  1 >  0v1(e(^ y1); ^ y0)=v1(e(^ y1); ^ y1) > 1.
4.3 Comparative statics: equilibria of dierent sizes
A natural question is whether the players are better o in an equilibrium of a higher size.
The chair clearly (weakly) prefers a size-two equilibrium to a size-one equilibrium because her
decisions are based on better information in a size-two equilibrium. As to legislator 1, consider
the following two cases. (i) Suppose zNT is elicited in a size-one equilibrium. Then legislator
1's payo is the same as his status quo payo. Since in any size-two equilibrium, the payo
of any type 1  
1 is the same as his status quo payo and the payo of any type 1 < 
1 is
strictly higher than his status quo payo, legislator 1 is better o in a size-two equilibrium. (ii)
Suppose z0 6= zNT is elicited in a size-one equilibrium. Whether legislator 1 is better o in a
size-two equilibrium depends on the size-two equilibrium under consideration. But note that for
any size-one equilibrium in which z0 is rejected with positive probability, a size-two equilibrium
exists in which every type of legislator 1 has the same payo as in the size-one equilibrium.17
In this sense, legislator 1 is again (weakly) better o in a size-two equilibrium.
5 Two senders
We now analyze  f1;2g, the game with two legislators. Without loss of generality, assume that
^ y1  ^ y2, which implies that e(^ y1)  e(^ y2). Since legislator 1's ideal point is closer to the
chair's, we call legislator 1 the closer legislator and legislator 2 the more distant legislator. As
is common in the voting literature and cheap-talk literature, we restrict attention to a class
17To construct it, let 
0
1 <  1 be the type just willing to accept z
0. Let 1 (1) = m
c
1 if 1  
0
1; 1 (1) = m
f
1
if 1 > 
0
1,  (m
c
1) = z
0, (m
f
1) = z
NT and  (m) 2 f(m
c
1);(m
f
1))g for any other m1 2 M1. In this size-two
equilibrium, the payo for any 1 < 
0
1 is u1 (z
0;1) and the payo for any 1  
0
1 is u1 (s;1), the same as in
the size-one equilibrium.
12of equilibria called monotone equilibria.18 An equilibrium (;;) is monotone if for any
0
i  00
i and i = 1;2, i (0
i) = i (00
i ) implies that i (i) = i (0
i) for any i 2 [0
i;00
i ]. In
a monotone equilibrium, the set of types that send the same message is an interval, possibly
a singleton.19 We discuss a class of non-monotone equilibria and why they are not robust to
\trembles" at the voting stage towards the end of Section 5.2.
5.1 Proposals elicited in monotone equilibria
Say that a proposal (y;x) is a one-transfer proposal if either x1 > 0 or x2 > 0 but not both,
a two-transfer proposal if both x1 > 0 and x2 > 0, and a no-transfer proposal if x1 = 0 and
x2 = 0. The following lemma provides sucient conditions under which no proposal elicited
in a monotone equilibrium is a two-transfer proposal. Suppose Fi has a dierentiable density
function fi for i = 1;2. Recall that fi(i)=(1   Fi(i)) is the hazard rate and Fi satises the
strict increasing hazard rate property (IHRP) if fi(i)=(1   Fi(i)) is strictly increasing in i.
Lemma 3. If the prior Fi (i = 1;2) satises the IHRP in  f1;2g, then any proposal elicited in
a monotone equilibrium has xi > 0 for at most one i 6= 0.
To see why Lemma 3 holds, consider the support of the chair's posterior. If it is a singleton
for at least one of the legislators, say legislator 1, then given any proposal, the chair knows
whether legislator 1 will accept or reject it. A two-transfer proposal is not optimal because if
legislator 1 accepts it, then the chair is strictly better o reducing x2 and if legislator 1 rejects
it, then the chair is strictly better o reducing x1. If the support of the posterior on i is not
a singleton for both i = 1;2, then a two-transfer proposal results in a positive probability that
both legislators vote for the proposal, which is \wasteful" for the chair because she needs only
one other vote to pass her proposal. Under the IHPR, the waste is suciently high that it is not
optimal for the chair to give transfers to both legislators. Many commonly used distribution
18For example, in a model of committee decision making, Perciso (2003) restricts attention to equilibria in
which each juror's strategy is monotone, i.e., the probability of voting \convict" is higher if the signal is guilty
than if it is innocent; in a model of cheap talk with two senders, Krishna and Morgan (2001) restrict attention
to equilibria in which the receiver's action is monotone in the sender's type; and in a model of cheap talk with
lying costs, Kartik (2009) restricts attention to equilibria in which the message strategy is monotone, i.e., the
sender makes a higher claim when his type is higher.
19We call these equilibria monotone because the set of types who send the same message is an interval (possibly
a singleton) if and only if there exists a partial order % on Mi such that the message rule i is monotone (i.e.
i (
0
i) % i (i) if 
0
i > i) for i = 1;2.
13functions, including uniform, normal, log-normal and beta distributions, satisfy the IHRP. This
property is also frequently assumed in the economics and political science applications.20
The next two lemmas establish some properties of no-transfer proposals and one-transfer
proposals, which are useful in equilibrium characterization.
Lemma 4. Suppose z = (y;x) is elicited in an equilibrium in  f1;2g with x1 = x2 = 0. Then (i)
y = e(^ y1); (ii) u1 (z;1) = u1 (s;1) for any 1 2 1; (iii) If e(^ y1) = e(^ y2), then u2 (z;2) =
u2 (s;2) for any 2 2 2; and (iv) If e(^ y1) < e(^ y2), then u2 (z;2) < u2 (s;2) for any 2 2 2
and legislator 1 is pivotal with respect to z.
To see why Lemma 4 holds, suppose z is elicited in an equilibrium with x1 = x2 = 0.
Since e(^ y1)  ^ y1  ^ y2, if y < e(^ y1), neither legislator accepts z, and if y  e(^ y1), at least
legislator 1 accepts z. Since v (y; ^ y0) is decreasing in y when y  e(^ y1) > ^ y0, it is optimal to
propose y = e(^ y1). So the optimal no-transfer proposal z is equal to (e(^ y1);c;0;0), denoted
by zNT. Since x1 = 0 and y = e(^ y1), we have u1 (z;1) = u1 (s;1) for any 1. Similarly, if
e(^ y1) = e(^ y2), we have u2 (z;2) = u2 (s;2) for any 2. Since v (y; ^ y2) is increasing in y when
y < ^ y2, if e(^ y1) < e(^ y2)  ^ y2, we have u2 (z;2) < u2 (s;2) for any 2, and legislator 1 is
pivotal. The next lemma says that the legislator who is excluded in a one-transfer proposal
rejects it, making the legislator who is included pivotal.
Lemma 5. Suppose z = (y;x) is elicited in an equilibrium in  f1;2g and xi > 0, xj = 0. Then
uj (s;j) > ui (z;j) for all j 2 j and ui (z;i)  ui (s;i) for some i 2 i. Hence legislator
j rejects z and legislator i is pivotal with respect to z.
If F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP, then by Lemma 3, any proposal elicited in a monotone
equilibrium is either a no-transfer or a one-transfer proposal. This simplies the problem of
characterizing elicited proposals in a monotone equilibrium. Specically, recall that ti (z) is the
highest type willing to accept z if some i prefers z to s and ti (z) = i otherwise. Suppose the
chair's posterior is G = (G1;G2). Let  (z) = 1   [1   G1 (t1 (z))][1   G2 (t2 (z))] and
z (G) 2 argmax
z2Y X
u0 (z) (z) + u0 (s)(1    (z)).
That is, z (G) is an optimal proposal for the chair under belief G. Let U0 (G) be the associated
value function, i.e., U0 (G) is the highest expected payo for the chair under belief G.
20See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a list of distribution functions that satisfy the increasing hazard rate
property and references to some of the seminal papers that assume it.
14Similarly, let z j (Gi) be a proposal that gives the chair the highest expected payo among
all the proposals that exclude legislator j, under belief Gi (i 6= j), and let U
 j
0 (Gi) be the
associated value function. Note that z j (Gi) does not depend on Gj because for if a proposal
excludes j, either every type of legislator j accepts it or no type of legislator j accepts it.
Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. Fix a monotone equilibrium (;;). Let H (m) =
(H1 (m1);H2 (m2)) be the chair's posterior when receiving m. By Lemma 3, for any m
sent in this equilibrium, z (H (m)) is not a two-transfer proposal and therefore U0 (H (m)) =
maxi=1;2 U
 j
0 (Hi (mi)). Note that U
 j
0 (Hi (mi))  u0(zNT) for i = 1;2. Thus, if U
 j
0 (Hi (mi)) >
U i
0 (Hj (mj)), then it is optimal for the chair to exclude j and include i. If U
 j
0 (Hi (mi)) =
u0(zNT) for i = 1;2, then zNT is an optimal proposal for the chair.
Since a babbling equilibrium is a monotone equilibrium, all the results established for mono-
tone equilibria apply to babbling equilibria. Specically, suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the increas-
ing hazard rate property. If U
 j
0 (Fi) > U i
0 (Fj)  u0(zNT), then the proposal elicited in any
babbling equilibrium includes i and excludes j; if U 2
0 (F1) = U 1
0 (F2) > u0(zNT), then the
proposal elicited in any babbling equilibrium is a one-transfer proposal that includes either 1
or 2; if U 2
0 (F1) = U 1
0 (F2) = u0(zNT), then there exists a babbling equilibrium in which the
no-transfer proposal zNT is elicited.
5.2 Informative equilibria
In this section, we characterize equilibria in  f1;2g in which some information is transmitted.
Throughout this section, we assume that F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP.
Fix a monotone equilibrium (;;) and consider the proposals  (m) and  (m0) where
mi = m0
i for some i 2 f1;2g. Suppose both (m) and (m0) exclude legislator j 6= i. That is,
z j(Hi(mi)) is an optimal proposal when the chair receives m and z j(Hi(m0
i)) is an optimal
proposal when she receives m0. If z j(Hi(mi)) is unique, then, since mi = m0
i, and both
 (m) and  (m0) exclude j, we must have  (m) =  (m0) = z j(Hi(mi)). If z j(Hi(mi)) is
not unique, then conceivably (m) 6= (m0), but this requires that the chair chooses dierent
proposals { none of which include legislator j { for dierent messages sent by legislator j,
although she has the same belief about legislator i.
We now consider a renement which rules out the preceding scenario. Call a monotone
equilibrium (;;) a simple monotone equilibrium (SME) if the following condition is
satised: for any m and m0 such that mi = m0
i for some i 2 f1;2g, if both (m) and (m0)
15exclude legislator j 6= i, then (m) = (m0). We nd this to be a reasonable renement because
when the chair optimally excludes legislator j, her proposal depends only on her belief about
legislator i's type, which has nothing to do with what legislator j says. This renement is also
automatically satised if z j(Hi(mi)) is unique. (Uniqueness of z j(Hi(mi)) holds under some
familiar functional forms: Lemma 8 in the Supplementary Appendix shows that if Hi (mi) is a
uniform distribution and v (y; ^ yi) =  (y   ^ yi)
2, then z j(Hi(mi)) is unique.)
Say that i is a size-one message rule if i (i) = i (0
i) for all i;0
i 2 i, and i is a size-two
message rule if there exists a set Ai  i with Pi (i 2 Ai) 2 (0;1) such that (i) i (i) = i (0
i)
if either i;0
i 2 Ai or i;0
i 2 inAi, and (ii) i (i) 6= i (0
i) if i 2 Ai and 0
i 2 inAi.
Recall that ;; (1;2) is the outcome for type prole (1;2) under (;;). Fix an
equilibrium (;;). Say that i is equivalent to 0
i if for almost all (1;2) 2 1  2 and
0
j = j, we have ;; (1;2) = 0;; (1;2). The message rule i is equivalent to 0
i in the
sense that the joint distributions on type proles and outcomes are the same under i and 0
i,
holding the other strategies in (;;) xed.
We say legislator i is uninformative in equilibrium (;;) if there exists a size-one message
rule I
i such that i is equivalent to I
i, and legislator i is informative in (;;) otherwise.21
Say that (;;) is an informative equilibrium if at least one legislator is informative in (;;).
For any z 2 Y X, let Ii (z) = 1 if z includes legislator i and Ii (z) = 0 if z excludes legislator
i. Let qi (mi) =
R
j Ii ( (mi;j (j)))dFj be the probability that legislator i is included when
sending mi in (;;).22
Proposition 3. Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. Fix a simple monotone equilibrium
(;;) in  f1;2g. Suppose legislator i is informative in this equilibrium. Then there exist mc
i,
m
f
i 2 Mi such that qi (mc
i) > 0, qi(m
f
i ) = 0. Moreover, i is equivalent to a size-two message
rule II
i with the property that there exists 
i 2
 
i;  i

such that II
i (i) = mc
i for i < 
i and
II
i (i) = m
f
i for i > 
i.
Proposition 3 says that in any SME, legislator i can convey only a limited amount of
21It is possible that legislator i partially reveals his type in (;;), but he is still uninformative by our
denition. For example, suppose the chair optimally excludes i for i suciently close to  i. Suppose also that
i (i) reveals i if i 2 ( i   ";  i] for " suciently small. Although the chair updates her belief for messages
sent by i 2 ( i   ";  i], her proposal does not depend on i (i). Since the information about i is useless for
the chair's decision and irrelevant for the outcome, we consider legislator i to be uninformative in this case.
22To simplify notation, we use (mi;j(j)) to denote a message prole in which legislator i sends mi and
legislator j sends j(j). We use analogous notation for other vectors of variables involving legislators i and j.
16information in that even when informative, his message rule is equivalent to a size-two message
rule. To give a sketch of the proof, we rst show that in (;;), there exists at most one mi
sent by a positive measure of i such that qi (mi) > 0; when such a message exists, the types
who send this message forms an interval at the lower end of i. We also show that there exists
at most one message mi sent by a single type such that qi (mi) > 0. So at most two mi's
have the property that qi (mi) > 0 and one of them is sent by only a single type. Consider
the following two possibilities: (a) Suppose there exists no mi sent with positive probability
such that qi (mi) > 0. Then qi (i (i)) = 0 for almost all i 2 i. Since the proposal and the
resulting outcome does not depend on mi if legislator i is excluded in a SME, it follows that i
is equivalent to a size-one message rule such that every i sends the same message that results
in zero probability that legislator i is included. (b) Suppose mc
i is sent with positive probability
and qi (mc
i) > 0. If legislator i is informative, then there exists m
f
i sent by some type such that
qi(m
f
i ) = 0. Since in (;;), the types who send mc
i form an interval at the lower end of i,
there exists a threshold 
i such that any type below 
i send mc
i and almost every type above

i sends a message that results in zero probability that i is included. Hence i is equivalent to
II
i such that II
i (i) = mc
i for i < 
i and II
i (i) = m
f
i for i > 
i.
The next proposition says that at most one legislator is informative in an SME.
Proposition 4. Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. Fix a simple monotone equilibrium
(;;) in  f1;2g. (i) At most one legislator is informative in (;;). (ii) If e(^ y1) < e(^ y2),
then legislator 2 is uninformative in (;;).
To gain some intuition for Proposition 4, imagine that both legislators are informative
in (;;). Then, by Proposition 3, both legislators are included with positive probability.
By Lemmas 3 and 5, a legislator's payo is weakly higher than his status quo payo when
included, but strictly lower than his status quo payo when the other legislator is included. So,
independent of his type, each legislator has an incentive to send the message that generates
the highest probability of inclusion. But as Proposition 3 shows, if a legislator is informative,
then with positive probability, he sends a message that results in zero probability of inclusion,
a contradiction. As to why legislator 2 is uninformative when e(^ y1) < e(^ y2), note that in
this case, under the no-transfer proposal zNT, legislator 2's payo is strictly lower than his
status quo payo. Therefore, between mc
2 and m
f
2 as described in Proposition 3, every type of
legislator 2 strictly prefers to send mc
2 (with q2 (mc
2) > 0) than m
f
2 (with q2(m
f
2) = 0), again a
17contradiction.
What are the proposals elicited in an informative equilibrium? Consider an SME (;;)
in which legislator i is informative. For simplicity, assume j (j) = m
j for all j 2 j, and
i (i) = mc
i for i < 
i and i (i) = m
f
i for i > 
i where qi (mc
i) > 0 and qi(m
f
i ) = 0. Since
qi(m
f
i ) = 0, (m
f
i ;m
j) excludes legislator i. Suppose (m
f
i ;m
j) includes legislator j. Then, by
Lemmas 3 and 5, legislator j is pivotal with respect to (m
f
i ;m
j) and accepts it with positive
probability, implying that by sending m
f
i , type i's payo is strictly lower than ui (s;i). Since
qi (mc
i) > 0, (mc
i;m
j) includes legislator i, and by Lemma 5, type i's payo by sending mc
i is
weakly higher than ui (s;i). Therefore any type i > 
i has an incentive to deviate and send
mc
i, a contradiction. It follows that (m
f
i ;m
j) excludes j as well as i and (m
f
i ;m
j) = zNT.
As to (mc
i;m
j), it includes i and has y < e(^ y1);xi > 0 and xj = 0. To summarize:
Proposition 5. Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. Fix an informative simple monotone
equilibrium (;;) in  f1;2g in which legislator i uses a size-two message rule and legislator
j uses a size-one message rule. Then there exists 
i 2
 
i;  i

such that for any j 2 j,
if i > 
i, then (i(i);j(j)) = zNT, and if i < 
i, then (i(i);j(j)) = (y;x) with
y < e(^ y1), xi > 0, and xj = 0.
Similar to the one-sender case, we can interpret the message sent by types below 
i as the
\compromise" message, and the message sent by types above 
i as the \ght" message. The
chair responds to the \compromise" message with a proposal that gives legislator i some private
benet and moves the policy towards her own ideal and responds to the \ght" message with a
proposal that involves minimum policy change and gives no private benet to either legislator.
To illustrate what an informative equilibrium looks like, we provide the following example.
Example 1. Suppose ~ y = 0, ^ y0 =  1, ^ y1 =  0:2, ^ y2 = 0:5, c = 1. Assume 0 = 1, 1 and 2
are both uniformly distributed on [1=4;4], and player i's utility function is xi   i (y   ^ yi)
2.
Suppose 1 (1) = mc
1 if 1 2 [1=4;1] and 1 (1) = m
f
1 if 1 2 (1;4];23 2 (2) = m
2 for
all 2. Given the message rules, when the chair receives mc
1, she infers that 1 2 [1=4;1].
Calculation shows that  (mc
1;m
2) = ( 0:6;0:88;0:12;0), a proposal that gives legislator 1 a
positive transfer and moves the policy towards the chair's ideal.24 When the chair receives m
f
1,
23Here we let 

1 = 1, but there are many other equilibria given by dierent thresholds.
24In this example, the proposal that the chair makes in response to (m
c
1;m

2) is accepted with probability 1 by
legislator 1. There are examples in which a proposal made in response to a compromise message may fail to pass
18she infers that 1 2 (1;4]. Calculation shows that it is optimal to propose zNT = ( 0:4;1;0;0).
Intuitively, it is too costly for the chair to move the policy closer to her ideal because legislator
1 is too intensely ideological and legislator 2 holds an ideological position that is too far away.
Our analysis has focused on monotone equilibria. Similar to  f1g, non-monotone equilibria
may exist in  f1;2g in which types i < 
i of legislator i elicit (y;x) with y < e(^ y1), xi > 0,
and xj = 0, some types i > 
i elicit zNT and accept it, and other types i > 
i elicit the
same proposal as that elicited by types below 
i and reject it, and legislator j babbles. Note
that similar to  f1g, these non-monotone equilibria are not robust to \trembles" by either
legislator at the voting stage, i.e., if either legislator might not carry out a planned rejection,
then legislator i's best message rule is to safely elicit zNT when i > 
i.25
We next provide conditions for the existence of SME in which legislator 1 is informative.
(The conditions are similar for SME in which legislator 2 is informative, with the additional
requirement that e(^ y1) = e(^ y2).)
The existence conditions for informative equilibria in  f1;2g are analogous to those in  f1g,
but with the additional condition that it is optimal for the chair to exclude legislator 2. This is
guaranteed if U 1
0 (F2) = u0
 
zNT
. To see this, recall that U 1
0 (F2) is the highest payo the
chair gets by excluding 1. If U 1
0 (F2) = u0
 
zNT
, then no proposal that includes 2 gives the
chair a higher payo than zNT and therefore it is optimal for the chair to exclude 2. Recall
that z1 (1) is the chair's optimal proposal when facing only legislator 1 with known 1. We
have the following result (the proof is omitted since it is similar to that of Proposition 2):
Proposition 6. Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. A simple monotone equilibrium in which
legislator 1 is informative exists if and only if (i) z1   1

= (e(^ y1);c;0;0), (ii) z1 (1) =
(y;c   x1;x1;0) for some y < e(^ y1) and x1 > 0, and (iii) U 1
0 (F2) = u0(zNT).
with positive probability. For example, suppose the distribution of 1 is a truncated exponential distribution
on [1=4;4] with the parameter  = 4, i.e., F1(1) =
 
e
 1   e
 4x
=
 
e
 1   e
 16
. Keep all the other parametric
assumptions unchanged and assume 1 (1) = m
c
1 if 1 2 [1=4;2] and 1 (1) = m
f
1 if 1 2 (2;4] and 2 (2) = m

2
for all 2. Then  (m
c
1;m

2) = ( 0:585;0:883;0:117;0) and it is rejected by all types of legislator 2 and accepted
by legislator 1 if and only if 1  1:076. Hence it fails to pass with strictly positive probability.
25These \trembles" at the voting stage imply that a legislator should elicit the proposal he prefers most. In
addition to non-monotone equilibria, some monotone equilibria may not be robust to such trembles. For instance,
in the example in footnote 24, some types below 

1 rejects the proposal they elicit, and they are better o by
safely eliciting z
NT, if there is any possibility of trembles at the voting stage. If the threshold 

1 is suciently
low, however, then we have a monotone equilibrium in which the proposal made in response to the \compromise"
message is accepted with probability 1. Such a monotone equilibrium is robust to trembles at the voting stage.
19Similar to  f1g, condition (i) is satised if  1 is suciently high and condition (ii) is satised
if 1 is suciently low. Condition (iii) is satised, roughly, if 2 is suciently likely to be high.
5.3 Comparative statics
Two comparisons seem especially interesting. The rst is the comparison between informative
and uninformative equilibria in  f1;2g. The second is the comparison of equilibria in  f1;2g and
those in  f1g, which allows us to answer: is the chair always better o bargaining with more
legislators? Surprisingly, we show below that although the chair needs only one legislator's
support to pass a proposal, she may be worse o when facing two legislators than just one.
Comparing informative and uninformative equilibria: Let Eu be an uninformative equi-
librium and EI be an SME in which legislator i is informative in  f1;2g. Since the chair benets
from information transmission, she is better o in EI than in Eu. The welfare comparison for
the informative legislator is similar to that in the one-sender case (page 12); in particular, he
benets from information transmission as well. The uninformative legislator j, however, may
be worse o when legislator i is informative. To illustrate, suppose the proposal elicited in Eu
is zNT. Since in an informative SME the elicited proposals are zNT and (y;x) with y < e(^ y1)
and xj = 0, and legislator j prefers e(^ y1) to any y < e(^ y1), he is better o in Eu.
Does it benet the chair to face more legislators? Under complete information, the chair
is clearly better o bargaining with two legislators than only one because she gains exibility as
to who to make a deal with, as shown at the end of section 3. Under asymmetric information,
however, the answer is less clear. As illustrated in the following example, having two legislators
may result in less information transmitted in equilibrium and this hurts the chair.
Example 2. Suppose c = 1; ~ y = 0, u0 (z) = x0   0 (y   ^ y0)
2 where 0 = 1; ^ y0 =  1 and
u1(z;1) = x1   1 (y   ^ y1)
2 where ^ y1 =  0:2 and 1 is uniformly distributed on [1=4;4].
Consider  f1g, in which the chair faces only legislator 1. Size-two equilibria exists in  f1g.
For instance, analogous to Example 1, a size-two equilibrium exists in which 1 (1) = mc
1 if
1 2 [1=4;1] and 1 (1) = m
f
1 if 1 2 (1;4]. The chair's payo in this equilibrium is 0:656. Now
consider  f1;2g in which the chair faces both legislators 1 and 2.26 Suppose u2(z;2) = x2  
2 (y   ^ y2)
2 where ^ y2 =  0:201 and 2 is uniformly distributed on [5;10]. Since e(^ y2) < e(^ y1),
26Although earlier we assumed that ^ y1  ^ y2 for expositional convenience, in this example, in order to discuss
all possibilities, we allow ^ y1 > ^ y2.
20by Proposition 4 (ii) (adapted to the case with e(^ y2) < e(^ y1)), legislator 1 is not informative
in any SME in  f1;2g. Calculation shows that z2(2) = (y;x) where y = e(^ y2) and x2 = 0.
Since a necessary condition for the existence of SME in which legislator 2 is informative is
z2(2) = (y;x) where y < e(^ y2) and x2 > 0, legislator 2 is not informative in any SME either. In
any uninformative equilibrium in  f1;2g, the proposal ( 0:402;1;0;0) is elicited with probability
1 and the chair's payo is 0:642, lower than 0:656, her payo in the size-two equilibrium that
we identied in  f1g.
In the preceding example, the chair is worse o when we add legislator 2 whose position
is closer to the chair's (making it impossible for legislator 1 to be informative) but who is
intensely ideological (making it impossible for himself to be informative). What happens if
we add a legislator whose position is further away from the chair's? Can it still result in
informational loss? The next example shows that the answer is yes. Suppose ^ y2 =  0:1 and
2 is uniformly distributed on [1=4;4=5]. Since e(^ y1) < e(^ y2), by Proposition 4, legislator 2 is
uninformative in any SME in  f1;2g. Calculation shows that z 1(F2) = (y;x) where y =  0:6
and x2 = 0:192, i.e., conditional on excluding 1, the chair's proposal includes 2. So condition
(iii) in Proposition 6 fails and it is not possible for legislator 1 to be informative in any SME
in  f1;2g either.27 In any uninformative equilibrium in  f1;2g, the proposal z 1(F2) is elicited
with probability 1, resulting in a payo of 0:648 for the chair, still lower than 0:656. So, the
chair is again worse o when she faces two legislators rather than one.
To summarize, the chair may be better o bargaining with only one legislator when the
informational loss resulting from having two legislators is suciently high. This contrasts with
Krishna and Morgan (2001b), in which a decision maker is never worse o when facing two
senders rather than one. In their model, the senders have the same information, and for any
equilibrium in the one-sender case, there exists an equilibrium when another sender is added
which gives the decision maker a payo at least as high as his original equilibrium payo.
5.4 Benets of bundled bargaining
In the model considered so far, the chair makes a proposal on an ideological dimension and
a distributive dimension, and the two dimensions are accepted or rejected together. (Call
this the \bundled bargaining" game.) A natural question is whether the chair is better o
27Intuitively, if legislator 1 is informative in some SME, then the chair responds to his \ght" message by
including 2, making 1 strictly worse o than the status quo and giving him an incentive to deviate.
21bundling the two dimensions or negotiating them separately. Specically, consider a \separate
bargaining" game in which the chair, after receiving the messages, makes a proposal on only the
ideological dimension and another on only the distributive dimension. The legislators vote on
each proposal separately. In this game, it is possible that a proposal on one dimension passes
while the proposal on the other dimension fails to pass.
The chair is better o in the bundled bargaining game. To see why, note that in the
separate bargaining game, the legislators' private information is irrelevant since it is about how
they trade o one dimension for the other, not about their preferences on either dimension.
The resulting unique equilibrium outcome is zNT. In the bundled bargaining game, zNT is still
feasible and will pass if proposed, and this immediately implies that the chair cannot be worse
o. Indeed, bundling gives the chair two advantages: (1) Useful information may be revealed
in equilibrium, as seen in Proposition 5. (2) Given the information she has, the chair can use
private benet as an instrument to make better proposals that exploit the dierence in how
the players trade o the two dimensions. Because of these advantages, if the chair could choose
between bundled bargaining and separate bargaining, she would choose the former. Legislator
1 gets his status quo payo and legislator 2 is worse o than the status quo in the separate
bargaining game, but in the bundled bargaining game, the informative legislator is better o
than the status quo whereas the other (uninformative) legislator, is worse o than the status
quo. This result is reminiscent of the nding in Jackson and Moselle (2002), who also show
that legislators may prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together despite separable
preferences, but their model does not have asymmetric information or communication.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we develop a new model of legislative bargaining that incorporates private in-
formation about preferences and allows speech making before a bill is proposed. Although
the model is simple, our analysis generates interesting predictions about what speeches can be
credible even without commitment and how they inuence proposals and legislative outcomes.
We believe that both private information and communication are essential elements of the
legislative decision making process. Our paper has taken a rst step in understanding their roles
in legislative bargaining. There are many more issues to explore and many ways to generalize
and extend our model and what follows is a brief discussion of some of them.
22We have considered a multilateral bargaining game with only 3 players. In the Supple-
mentary Appendix, we take a rst step in generalizing our analysis to more than 3 players.
Specically, we analyze an extension in which there are n  3 legislators other than the chair,
but only two legislators have private information.28 The main results derived in the 3-players
case are robust. In particular, in the extension with n legislators, a legislator can still con-
vey limited information, i.e., whether he will \ght" or \compromise." Under majority rule,
any legislator who holds a position suciently distant from the chair's (specically, a position
further away from the chair's than the median position is) cannot be informative. There are
equilibria in which more than one legislator is informative, but this happens only when their
positions are weakly closer to the chair's than the median position is to the chair's.
Our motivation for incorporating private information into legislative bargaining is that indi-
vidual legislators know their preferences better than others. Another possible source of private
information is expertise (perhaps acquired through specialized committee work or from sta ad-
visors) regarding the consequences of policies. Although the role of this kind of \common value"
private information in legislative decision making has been studied (e.g. Austen-Smith (1990)),
it is only in the context of one-dimensional spatial policy making. It would be interesting to
explore it further when there is tradeo between ideology and distribution.
In our model the chair does not have private information about her preference, consistent
with the observation that bill proposers are typically established members with known positions.
Sometimes, however, legislators can be uncertain about the leaders' goals, and in particular,
how much compromise the leaders are willing to make in exchange for their votes. In this case,
the proposal put on the table may also reveal some of the proposer's private information. This
kind of signaling eect becomes especially relevant when the legislators have interdependent
preferences or when the proposal is not an ultimatum but can be modied if agreement fails.
We have considered a specic extensive form in which the legislators send messages simul-
28Suppose at least  votes other than the chair's are needed for a proposal to pass, and only two legislators
have private information. We show that if the prior satises the IHRP, then any proposal elicited in a monotone
equilibrium gives transfers to at most  legislators; if a privately informed legislator is included in a proposal,
then he has veto power with respect to that proposal. We then show that Propositions 3 and 4 (ii) generalize
to this extension. Although a full analysis of the more general case in which more than two legislators have
private information is beyond the scope of this paper, we still nd the extension in the Supplementary Appendix
useful because it applies to a legislature with a low turnover so that the preferences of most legislators are known
through past experience and only a few new members may have private information on their preferences.
23taneously. It would be interesting to explore whether and how some of our results change if the
legislators send messages sequentially. In that case, the design of the optimal order of speeches
(from the perspective of the proposer as well as the legislature) itself is an interesting ques-
tion. Another design question with respect to communication protocol is whether the messages
should be public or private. Although this distinction does not matter for the model in this
paper because we assume simultaneous speeches and one round of bargaining, it would matter
if either there were multiple rounds of bargaining or the preferences were interdependent.
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25Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Since type 1 weakly prefers z0 to z, we have x0
1 + 1v (y0; ^ y1)  x1 +
1v (y; ^ y1), which implies that x0
1   x1  1 (v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1)).
Suppose v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1)  0. Since x0
1   x1 > 0 and 0
1 > 0, it follows that x0
1   x1 >
0  0
1 (v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1)), i.e., x0
1 + 0
1v (y0; ^ y1) > x1 + 0
1v (y; ^ y1).
Suppose v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1) > 0. Then 1 (v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1)) > 0
1 (v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1))
for 1 > 0
1 and hence x0
1  x1 > 0
1 (v (y; ^ y1)   v (y0; ^ y1)), i.e., x0
1 +0
1v (y0; ^ y1) > x1 +0
1v (y; ^ y1).
(ii) Since type 1 weakly prefers z00 to z, we have x00
1 + 1v (y00; ^ y1)  x1 + 1v (y; ^ y1), which
implies that 1 (v (y00; ^ y1)   v (y; ^ y1))  x1 x00
1. Since x1 x00
1 > 0, we have v (y00; ^ y1) v (y; ^ y1) >
0. So, for 00
1 > 1, we have 00
1 (v (y00; ^ y1)   v (y; ^ y1)) > 1 (v (y00; ^ y1)   v (y; ^ y1))  x1   x00
1, i.e.,
x00
1 + 00
1v (y00; ^ y1) > x1 + 00
1v (y; ^ y1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose z0 and z00 are elicited in equilibrium (;;) and x0
1 > 0;x00
1 > 0.
For any z, let (z) = f1 : (1 (1)) = z and 1 (z;1) = 1g. Since any proposal elicited in
an equilibrium is accepted by some type who elicits it (page 7), (z0) 6= ? and (z00) 6= ?.
Let 0
1 = sup(z0) and 00
1 = sup(z00). Also, let o(1) = (1 (1)) if 1 (1 (1);1) = 1 and
o(1) = s otherwise, and let ue
1 (1) = u1 (o(1);1), i.e., ue
1 (1) is type 1's payo in (;;).
Claim 1. ue
1 (0
1) = u1 (z0;0
1) = u1 (s;0
1) and ue
1 (00
1) = u1 (z00;00
1) = u1 (s;00
1).
Proof. We show that ue
1 (0
1) = u1 (z0;0
1) = u1 (s;0
1). Similar arguments apply to 00
1.
To show that ue
1 (0
1) = u1 (z0;0
1), rst note that ue
1 (0
1)  u1 (z0;0
1) since type 0
1 can elicit
z0 and accept it. Suppose ue
1 (0
1) > u1 (z0;0
1). Since u1 (o(0
1);1)   u1 (z0;1) is continuous in
1, there exists 1 2 (z0) suciently close to 0
1 such that u1 (o(0
1);1) > u1 (z0;1). Since for
any 1 2 (z0), ue
1 (1) = u1 (z0;1), this is a contradiction.
To show that ue
1 (0
1) = u1 (s;0
1), rst note that for any 1, ue
1 (1)  u1 (s;1) since type
1 can reject the proposal it elicits. Suppose ue
1 (0
1) > u1 (s;0
1). Since ue
1 (0
1) = u1 (z0;0
1), we
have u1 (z0;0
1) > u1 (s;0
1). Since x0
1 > 0, there exists ^ z = (^ y; ^ x) with ^ y = y0 and ^ x1 2 (0;x0
1)
such that u1 (^ z;0
1) > u1 (s;0
1). Lemma 1 implies that for any 1 2 (z0), u1 (^ z;1) > u1 (s;1)
and 1 (^ z;1) = 1. Since u0 (^ z) > u0 (z0), this contradicts the optimality of z0.
We next show that z0 = z00. Suppose not. Consider the following two possibilities. (a)
Suppose x0
1 = x00
1 and without loss of generality, y0 < y00. Note that y0 < y00  e(^ y1)  ^ y1.
We have u1 (z0;1) < u1 (z00;1) for all 1 2 1 since x0
1 = x00
1 and u1 (z;1) is increasing in y
26for y < ^ y1, contradicting that (z0) 6= ?. (b) Suppose x0
1 6= x00
1 and without loss of generality,
x0
1 > x00
1. By denition of (z), for all 1 2 (z0), ue
1 (1) = u1 (z0;1)  u1 (z00;1) and for all
1 2 (z00), ue
1 (1) = u1 (z00;1)  u1 (z0;1). By Lemma 1, any type in (z0) is strictly lower
than any type in (z00) and therefore 0
1 < 00
1. Since u1(z00;00
1) = u1 (s;00
1) and x00
1 > 0, Lemma
1 implies that u1(z00;0
1) > u1 (s;0
1), contradicting ue
1 (0
1) = u1 (s;0
1). Hence z0 = z00.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a type 0
j such that uj(z;0
j) 
uj(s;0
j). Since xj = 0, this implies that v (y; ^ yj)  v (~ y; ^ yj) and therefore uj(z;j)  uj(s;j)
for all j 2 j. Consider z0 = (y0;x0) with y0 = y and x0
i = x0
j = 0. We have uj(z0;j)  uj(s;j)
and j (z0;j) = 1 for all j 2 j. Since x0
i < xi, we have u0(z0) > u0(z), contradicting the
optimality of z. Hence, every type of legislator j rejects z and legislator i is pivotal. Since
xi > 0, if ui(z;i) < ui(s;i) for all i 2 i, then proposing s is strictly better than z.
Therefore ui (z;i)  ui (s;i) for some i 2 i.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix a simple monotone equilibrium (;;) in  f1;2g. Recall that
Vi (mi;i) is type i's expected payo from sending mi in (;;) (page 6). For any i 2 i,
mi 2 Mi and interval T  j, let Vi (mi;ijT) be type i's expected payo if he sends mi,
conditional on j 2 T. We rst state and prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6. Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. Fix a simple monotone equilibrium (;;)
in  f1;2g. Suppose m = (1(1);2(2)) for some (1;2), and (m) = z = (y;x) with xi > 0.
Let s
i = supfi : i(i) = mig. Then, (i) ui(s;s
i)  ui(z;s
i), and (ii) Vi(mi;s
ij 1
j (mj)) =
ui(s;s
i), i.e., if type s
i elicits z followed by his optimal acceptance rule, he receives a payo
equal to ui(s;s
i).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that ui (z;s
i) > ui (s;s
i). Since xi > 0, there exists " > 0
and ^ z = (y;x0 + ";xi   ";xj) such that ui (^ z;s
i) > ui (s;s
i). Since i  s
i for any i 2
 1
i (mi), by Lemma 1, ^ z is accepted by any i 2  1
i (mi). Since u0(^ z) > u0(z), this contradicts
the optimality of z. So ui (s;s
i)  ui (z;s
i). If ui(z;s
i) = ui(s;s
i), then i(z;s
i) = 1. If
ui(z;s
i) < ui(s;s
i), then i(z;s
i) = 0. Since xi > 0, by Lemmas 3 and 5, legislator i is pivotal
with respect to z. Therefore Vi(mi;s
ij 1
j (mj)) = maxfui(z;s
i);ui(s;s
i)g = ui(s;s
i).
Lemma 7. Suppose F1 and F2 satisfy the IHRP. Fix a simple monotone equilibrium (;;)
in  f1;2g. Let 0
i < 00
i , m0
i = i (0
i), and m00
i = i (00
i ). Suppose qi (m00
i ) > 0. (i) If  1
i (m00
i ) is
not a singleton, then m0
i = m00
i . (ii) If  1
i (m00
i ) is a singleton, then  1
i (m0
i) is not a singleton.
27Proof. Part (i): Suppose to the contrary that m0
i 6= m00
i . We rst prove the following claim:
for any mj sent by some j 2 j, if  (m00
i ;mj) includes i then  (m0
i;mj) also includes i. This
claim implies that qi(m0
i)  qi(m00
i ). We then use this inequality to establish a contradiction.
Proof of the claim: Suppose  (m00
i ;mj) = (y00;x00) includes i. By Lemmas 3 and 5, legislator
i is pivotal with respect to  (m00
i ;mj). Since  (m00
i ;mj) is accepted with positive probability and
 1
i (m00
i ) is a non-degenerate interval, we have Pi
 
i 2  1
i (m00
i )jui ((m00
i ;mj);i)  ui(s;i)

>
0. By Lemma 1, if ui ( (m00
i ;mj);i)  ui (s;i), then ui( (m00
i ;mj); ~ i) > ui(s; ~ i) for all
~ i < i. Hence Pi
 
i 2  1
i (m00
i )jui ((m00
i ;mj);i) > ui(s;i)

> 0.
Given any " 2 (0;x00
i ), let z" = (y00;x00
0 + ";x00
i   ";x00
j). Since x00
i > 0, and ui is continuous
in xi, it follows that for " suciently small, Pi
 
i 2  1
i (m00
i )jui(z";i) > ui(s;i)

> 0 and
therefore ui (z";i) > ui (s;i) if i = inff 1
i (m00
i )g.
Since 0
i < 00
i , m0
i 6= m00
i and (;;) is a monotone equilibrium, supf 1
i (m0
i)g  inff 1
i (m00
i )g.
Let " 2 (0;x00
i ) be such that ui (z";i) > ui (s;i) for i = inff 1
i (m00
i )g. By Lemma 1,
ui (z";i) > ui(s;i) for all i 2  1
i (m0
i). Since u0 (z") > u0 ( (m00
i ;mj)) and z" is accepted
by all i 2  1
i (m0
i), we have U0 (H(m0
i;mj)) > U0 (H(m00
i ;mj)). Since  (m00
i ;mj) includes
i, it follows that U0 (H (m00
i ;mj))  U i
0 (Hj (mj)). So U0 (H(m0
i;mj)) > U0 (H(m00
i ;mj)) 
U i
0 (Hj (mj)), implying that  (m0
i;mj) includes i. This completes the proof of the claim.
The claim implies that qi (m0
i)  qi (m00
i ), and j = a
j [ b
j [ c
j where a
j = fj 2 jj
both  (m0
i;j (j)) and  (m00
i ;j (j)) exclude ig, b
j = fj 2 jj  (m0
i;j (j)) includes i and
 (m00
i ;j (j)) excludes ig, and c
j = fj 2 jj both  (m0
i;j (j)) and  (m00
i ;j (j)) include
ig. This claim also implies that c
j = fj 2 jj  (m00
i ;j (j)) include ig, and Pj(c
j) = qi(m00
i ).
Since qi(m00
i ) > 0, we have Pj(c
j) > 0.
Let l
i = sup 1
i (m0
i) and h
i = sup 1
i (m00
i ). Since  1
i (m00
i ) is not a singleton and
m0
i 6= m00
i , we have h
i > l
i. Note that if  (m0
i;j (j)) includes i, then by Lemma 6,
ui(s;l
i)  ui( (m0
i;j (j));l
i). Since h
i > l
i, by Lemma 1, ui(s;h
i ) > ui( (m0
i;j (j));h
i ).
Similarly, if  (m00
i ;j (j)) includes legislator i, then there exists a type i > l
i such that
ui( (m00
i ;j (j));i)  ui(s;i), and by Lemma 1, ui( (m00
i ;j (j));l
i) > ui(s;l
i). In what
follows, we show that if Vi
 
m0
i;l
i

 Vi
 
m00
i ;l
i

, then Vi
 
m0
i;h
i

> Vi
 
m00
i ;h
i

, which implies
that either type l
i or type h
i has a strictly protable deviation.
If j 2 a
j, then both  (m0
i;j (j)) and  (m00
i ;j (j)) exclude i, and therefore  (m0
i;j (j)) =
 (m00
i ;j (j)). So Vi(m0
i;ija
j) = Vi(m00
i ;ija
j) for all i. If j 2 c
j, then both  (m0
i;j (j))
and  (m00
i ;j (j)) include i. By Lemma 6, Vi(m0
i;l
ijc
j) = ui
 
s;l
i

and Vi(m00
i ;h
i jc
j) =
28ui
 
s;h
i

. As shown in the previous paragraph, Vi(m00
i ;l
ijc
j) > ui(s;l
i) and ui(s;h
i ) >
ui( (m0
i;j (j));h
i ) if j 2 c
j. By Lemmas 3 and 5, if j 2 c
j, legislator i is pivotal
with respect to  (m0
i;j (j)) and therefore Vi(m0
i;h
i jc
j) = ui
 
s;h
i

. So Vi(m0
i;l
ija
j [c
j) <
Vi(m00
i ;l
ija
j [ c
j) and Vi(m0
i;h
i ja
j [ c
j) = Vi(m00
i ;h
i ja
j [ c
j). Since Pj(c
j) > 0, it follows
that if Vi(m0
i;l
i)  Vi(m00
i ;l
i), then Pj(b
j) > 0 and Vi(m0
i;l
ijb
j) > Vi(m00
i ;l
ijb
j).
If j 2 b
j, then  (m0
i;j (j)) includes i. Similar arguments as those for c
j show that
Vi(m0
i;ijb
j) = ui (s;i) for i = l
i;h
i . Note that for any z and z0 such that both ex-
clude i, if ui (z;i)  ui (z0;i) for some i 2 i, then ui (z;i)  ui (z0;i) for all i 2 i.
Since  (m00
i ;j (j)) excludes i if j 2 b
j, if Vi(m0
i;l
ijb
j) = ui
 
s;l
i

> Vi(m00
i ;l
ijb
j), then
Vi(m0
i;h
i jb
j) = ui
 
s;h
i

> Vi(m00
i ;h
i jb
j). Suppose Vi(m0
i;l
i)  Vi(m00
i ;l
i). Recall that
this implies Pj(b
j) > 0 and Vi(m0
i;l
ijb
j) > Vi(m00
i ;l
ijb
j). It follows that Vi(m0
i;h
i jb
j) >
Vi(m00
i ;h
i jb
j). Since Vi(m0
i;h
i ja
j [c
j) = Vi(m00
i ;h
i ja
j [c
j), we have Vi(m0
i;h
i ) > Vi(m00
i ;h
i ),
a contradiction. Hence m00
i = m0
i.
Part (ii): Proof is similar to that of part (i). Suppose to the contrary that  1
i (m0
i) is a
singleton. As in part (i), we rst prove the claim that for any mj sent by some j 2 j, if
(m00
i ;mj) includes i, then (m0
i;mj) also includes i. To show this, suppose (m00
i ;mj) includes
i. Since  1
i (m00
i ) is a singleton, (m00
i ;mj) is accepted by 00
i , i.e., ui((m00
i ;mj);00
i )  ui(s;00
i ).
Since 0
i < 00
i , by Lemma 1, ui((m00
i ;mj);0
i) > ui(s;0
i). Given any " 2 (0;x00
i ), let z" =
(y00;x00
0 + ";x00
i   ";x00
j). Since x00
i > 0 and ui is continuous in xi, we have ui (z";0
i) > ui (s;0
i)
for " suciently low. The rest of the proof is the same as that of part (i).
Let ^ Mi = fmijmi = i (i) for some i, and qi (mi) > 0g. Lemma 7 implies that j ^ Mij  2,
and if j ^ Mij = 2, then there exists an ^ mi 2 ^ Mi such that fiji (i) = ^ mig is a singleton.
We next show that if Pi (qi (i(i)) > 0) = 1 or Pi (qi (i(i)) = 0) = 1, then legislator i is
uninformative in (;;). Suppose Pi (qi (i(i)) > 0) = 1. Lemma 7 implies that there exists
a message mc
i such that qi(mc
i) > 0 and Pi(i(i) = mc
i) = 1. Hence i is equivalent to the
size-one message rule I
i(i) = mc
i for all i. Next, suppose Pi (qi (i(i)) = 0) = 1. Consider a
type ^ i such that qi(i(^ i)) = 0 and a size-one message rule I
i (i) such that I
i (i) = i(^ i)
for all i. To see that i is equivalent to I
i, consider any i such that qi (i (i)) = 0. Note that
in an SME, for any mj, (i(^ i);mj) =  (i (i);mj) if they both exclude legislator i. Since
qi(i(^ i)) = qi (i (i)) = 0, it follows that (i(^ i);j (j)) =  (i (i);j (j)) for almost all
j 2 j. Since Pi (qi (i(i)) = 0) = 1, it follows that i is equivalent to I
i.
Hence, if legislator i is informative in (;;), then we have Pi (qi (i(i)) = 0) 2 (0;1) and
29Pi (qi (i(i)) > 0) 2 (0;1). By Lemma 7, there exists a message mc
i and a type 
i 2
 
i;  i

such that qi(mc
i) > 0 and i(i) = mc
i for all i < 
i and qi(i(i)) = 0 for almost all i  
i.
Pick any ^ i such that qi(i(^ i)) = 0, and let m
f
i = i(^ i). Then i is equivalent to II
i such
that II
i (i) = mc
i for i < 
i and II
i (i) = m
f
i for i > 
i.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let 0
i = fi 2 ijqi(i(i)) = 0g. Proposition 3 and Lemma 7 imply
that if legislator i is informative, then there exists mc
i 2 Mi such that qi (mc
i) > 0, Pi(iji(i) =
mc
i) 2 (0;1) and Pi(iji(i) = mc
i) + Pi(0
i) = 1. Let c
i = fi 2 iji(i) = mc
ig.
Part (i): Suppose to the contrary that both legislators 1 and 2 are informative in (;;).
Consider the following two cases.
(a) Suppose  (mc
1;mc
2) excludes 1. Consider any ~ m1 2 M1 such that q1(~ m1) = 0. Since
P2(c
2) > 0, (~ m1;mc
2) excludes 1. Thus, (mc
1;mc
2) = (~ m1;mc
2). Note that this holds for any
~ m1 with q1(~ m1) = 0. Since q2(mc
2) > 0 and P1(c
1) + P1(0
1) = 1, we have q2(mc
2) = 1.
Since P1(c
1) > 0, the proposal (mc
1;2(2)) excludes 2 for all 2 2 0
2, and (mc
1;2(2))
is the same for all 2 2 0
2. Since (mc
1;mc
2) excludes 1 and q1(mc
1) > 0, we have P2(2j2 2
0
2 and (mc
1;2(2)) includes 1) > 0. Hence (mc
1;2(2)) includes 1 for all 2 2 0
2. Recall
that Vi (mi;i) is type i's expected payo from sending mi in (;;) (page 6). Consider
any type 2 2 0
2. Since q2 (mc
2) = 1, Lemmas 3 and 5 imply that V2 (mc
2;2)  u2 (s;2).
Since  (mc
1;2(2)) includes 1 and P1(c
1) > 0, Lemmas 3 and 5 imply that V2 (2 (2);2) <
u2 (s;2). Hence any type 2 2 0
2 is strictly better o by sending mc
2, a contradiction.
(b) Suppose  (mc
1;mc
2) includes 1. Then the same arguments as in case (a) show that
q1 (mc
1) = 1 and any 1 2 0
1 is strictly better o by sending mc
1 than 1(1), a contradiction.
Part (ii): Suppose to the contrary that legislator 2 is informative. Fix any type 2 2 0
2 and
let 0
1 = f1jboth  (1 (1);mc
2) and  (1 (1);2 (2)) exclude 2g and 00
1 = f1j (1 (1);mc
2)
includes 2 and  (1 (1);2(2)) excludes 2g. If 1 2 0
1, then  (1 (1);2 (2)) =  (1 (1);mc
2).
If 1 2 00
1, then  (1 (1);mc
2) includes 2 (and excludes 1 by Lemma 3). By Lemma 5, con-
ditional on 1 2 00
1, type 2's payo is weakly higher than u2 (s;2) if he sends mc
2. Since
e(^ y1) < e(^ y2), by Lemmas 4 and 5, conditional on 1 2 00
1, type 2's payo is strictly lower
than u2 (s;2) if he sends 2 (2). Since 2 2 0
2, we have q2(2(2)) = 0, which implies
P1 (0
1) + P1 (00
1) = 1. Note that P1 (00
1) = q2 (mc
2) > 0. So V2 (2 (2);2) < V2 (mc
2;2), i.e.,
any type 2 2 0
2 is strictly better o by sending mc
2, a contradiction.
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